

significant to work in this way with the Russian Federation. This treaty and mutual framework helps further align and strengthen the growing relationship between Russia and the United States. We should all be encouraged that Russia's Duma has made no reservations about this treaty and is expected to approve it soon after the Senate approves it.

The Moscow Treaty reduces the aggregate number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by the end of 2012. This is a tremendous accomplishment that deserves the full support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. President Bush and Russian President Putin hold this as a high priority in getting this treaty ratified in a timely manner.

This treaty was considered in a deliberative and thoughtful manner by the Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee worked in conjunction and cooperatively with the Armed Services Committee and Intelligence Committee. As well, the insights, reservations and recommendations on this issue were solicited and received by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers.

The Moscow Treaty is unlike any arms control agreement we have participated in with Russia or the former Soviet Union before. Previously, we spent decades with our counterparts in conferences and meetings to negotiate treaties. This agreement was concluded more quickly—with openness, trust, and verification prevailing in a new era of American and Russian relations.

Traditionally, there have always been many objections to treaties such as these which limit our arms and possibly put the United States at risk. Now, we are hearing of some who have said this treaty is not strong enough. And there has been some legitimate debate about the verification system and reduction schedule which I and many of my colleagues share.

But I do not believe these concerns rise to the level to oppose this treaty since it provides a mutual framework for pursuing the continued destruction of weapons and missiles whose sole purpose was to be used against the United States. This treaty is too important to oppose. It highlights and emphasizes the vitality of the new relationship between the United States and Russia. And with the ongoing war on terrorism, this is of utmost importance.

Like the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I believe our storage procedures are sound and I am thankful for the flexibility within the treaty for our strategic systems. Yet I, like many others, do share some concerns on the Russian side. But these concerns are alleviated since the Treaty has avenues we can pursue which addresses these possible problems to ensure that weapons do not ever slip into the wrong hands. Also, I am thankful Russia is

agreeable to work with the United States to ensure that these weapons never fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.

Also, one certainly must pay attention to, and demand, a solid verification system for these weapons. Some point out that the treaty has a flawed verification system that must be watched closely. But this criticism has not reached the level of doubt and worry to scrap the treaty. As well, those critics are operating under the guise of a cold war mentality. But things have changed in our relationship with Russia.

Secretary Powell has been upfront on this issue in regards to the verification system in the Treaty. On behalf of the administration, he has clarified the need to keep the verification process the way it is within the treaty. The administration points to the fact that the cold war is over and we must move beyond that thought process. Also, Secretary Powell argues that we are better served with flexibility and not rigidity under the treaty.

I believe the level of verification in this treaty is what is needed. We do know that our American verification experts already have the START Treaty verification procedures underway. These experts and procedures will be around for another decade. So, we do have dismantlement teams and equipment from the United States in Russia. These teams have been and will continue to cooperatively—with verification—dismantle these Russian weapons.

Overall, I believe this treaty is in the national interest of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the world. Of course there are those critics who say this treaty does not go far enough, and some may say it goes too far. The purpose of this treaty is not to put an umbrella over all arms policy for all countries all at once. These objectives and goals can be made through piecemeal approaches, and this is exactly what this treaty does.

We have a new ally with the Russian Federation, and we must move ahead to strengthen our relationship with this new ally and make this world a safer place. I urge my colleagues to support the Moscow Treaty without further conditions being set upon it. It is the right thing to do.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I congratulate Senators Lugar and Biden on their efforts on this treaty. In their new roles as chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, they have gotten off to an impressive start.

By holding a series of hearings on pressing foreign policy questions, including the looming war in Iraq, they have helped every Member of this body and every American.

In addition, they have taken the Moscow treaty, a treaty that came to us with perhaps more questions than answers, and added some definition. Their collective labors on behalf of this

treaty demonstrate what bipartisan leadership on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can accomplish.

This treaty represents a positive step forward by calling on the United States and Russia to reduce their operational strategic nuclear weapons.

But it is a step long overdue. Many in this body felt these kinds of cuts were possible years ago. Unfortunately, despite our best efforts for much of the last decade, Republican opposition prevented us from implementing the kind of cuts this treaty now recommends.

To ensure that we derive the maximum security benefit possible from this treaty, the Administration will have to fill in a number of important holes.

Though the administration has assured us that some nuclear warheads will be dismantled, the treaty itself does not require the destruction of any Russian or American nuclear warheads. At best, the treaty will put warheads out of reach, but, unfortunately, not out of use.

Moreover, the treaty does not include a schedule that spells out when the deactivations must occur. In fact, the treaty language does not require the deactivation of a single weapon until December 31, 2012, the day the Treaty expires.

Finally, the treaty also lacks any concrete commitments on verification, undermining longstanding, common-sense principle of our arms control policy.

In years past during Senate discussion of other arms control treaties, some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle based their opposition to these treaties on the lack of adequate verification provisions. Evidently, either verification is no longer as important to them or they are more willing to trust rather than verify.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings and inconsistencies, Mr. President, I intend to vote for the Resolution of Ratification, and I do so because it points our country in the right direction.

But at the same time I would like to send a message as loudly and clearly as I can to the administration and to my colleagues here in the Senate: our work to deal with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction does not—in fact cannot—stop with this vote.

Last fall, the President's National Security Strategy stated that:

The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.

We need look no further than the steadily escalating crisis in North Korea to recognize that the President was right on that point.

You will have to look much harder, however, to ascertain exactly what the administration proposes to do about this crisis, let alone the larger issue of proliferation worldwide.